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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LIMITATIONS ON ATTORNEYS' FEES IN
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc.,
37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985)
In Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc.,1 the California Supreme Court
rejected due process,2 equal protection, 3 and separation of powers4 chal-
lenges to a statutory limitation5 on contingency fees charged by a plain-
1. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
2. The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the laws."
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
In Roa, the plaintiffs raised a substantive due process challenge rather than a procedural due
process challenge. Substantive due process guarantees the fairness of the law or rule, whereas proce-
dural due process guarantees the fairness of the decision-making process. Under substantive due
process, the court reviews the substance of a law and determines if the law is compatible with the
Constitution.
If a law affects fundamental individual rights, such as the rights to vote, privacy, marriage, and
interstate travel, courts apply a strict scrutiny standard of review. Under strict scrutiny, the law
must be necessary to promote a compelling or overriding governmental interest. If the law does not
infringe upon fundamental rights, courts apply a rational basis test upholding the law if the law is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental end. Courts do not consider the wisdom of the law.
Courts normally apply this lower standard of review to economic or social welfare legislation. See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 416-19 (2d ed. 1983).
3. The fourteenth amendment also provides that: "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
The Constitution requires that the government treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The equal protection clause guarantees that legislative classifications will not be used arbi-
trarily to burden a certain group of individuals. The legislative classification must relate to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 586-94.
4. No specific constitutional provision exists for the concept of separation of powers, but the
United States Constitution divides the federal power among the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches. The separation of powers doctrine stands for the concept that one branch is not permitted
to encroach on the domain of another branch. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 2, at 135.
5. The statutory provision limiting the plaintiff's attorneys' fees provides in pertinent part:
(a) An attorney shall not contract for or collect a contingency fee for representing any
person seeking damages in connection with an action for injury or damage against a health
care provider based upon such person's alleged professional negligence in excess of the
following limits:
(1) Forty percent of the first fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) recovered.
(2) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)
recovered.
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tif's attorney6 in a medical malpractice action.
Plaintiffs, parents of a minor child, instituted a medical malpractice
action against health care providers7 to recover damages for injuries their
'child sustained during birth.' The plaintiffs settled with two of the de-
fendants for 500,000 dollars.9 Plaintiffs and their attorneys had agreed to
a contingency fee arrangement under which the attorneys were to receive
twenty-five percent of the net recovery. 10 Because the contingency fee
exceeded the maximum fee collectible under the statutory contingency
fee scale,"I the trial court refused to award the fee under the contract,12
awarding a fee in compliance with the statutory limitation.' 3 On appeal,
the California Supreme Court affirmed and held: the statutory limitation
on contingent attorneys' fees did not violate due process, equal protec-
tion, or the separation of powers doctrine.' 4
Legislative regulation of attorneys' fees is common. Congress, for ex-
ample, has passed several statutes limiting attorneys' fees."' In addition,
(3) Twenty-five percent of the next one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000)
recovered.
(4) Ten percent of any amount on which the recovery exceeds two hundred thou-
sand dollars ($200,000).
The limitations shall apply regardless of whether the recovery is by settlement, arbitration,
or judgment....
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1985).
6. The statutory provision does not regulate defense counsel fees. The original legislation,
however, directed the California State Bar Board of Governors to make recommendations to the
legislature on a method for regulating defense counsel fees. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146(c)
(Deering 1976). The Board recommended that the existing system of compensation be maintained
for defense counsel. See Note, California Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act: An Equal Pro-
tection Challenge, 52 S. CAL. L. REv. 829, 839 n.64 (1979).
7. The defendants included a physician, a professional medical corporation, and a hospital.
8. 37 Cal. 3d at 924, 695 P.2d at 165, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 78.
9. Id. The plaintiffs reached settlement with the physician and the professional corporation
for $500,000.
10. Id. Under this agreement, the attorneys would be entitled to $122,800.
11. Id.. The maximum fee collectible under § 6146 of the Business and Professions Code was
$90,800.
12. The California Probate Code requires a court to approve settlements of minors' claims and
to authorize reasonable attorneys' fees from the proceeds of the settlement. CAL. PROB. CODE
§§ 3500 & 3601 (Deering 1976 & Supp. 1984).
13. 37 Cal. 3d at 924-25, 695 P.2d at, 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79. Although the trial court
determined that the attorney would collect a fair and reasonable contingency fee under the fee agree-
ment, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges to the legislation and awarded
fees pursuant to the fee schedule contained in § 6146.
14. Id. at 925-33, 695 P.2d at 166-72, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79-85.
15. See, eg., American-Mexican Chamizal Convention Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 277d-21
(1982) (attorneys' fee shall not exceed 10% of judgment rendered to owners of land acquired by the
United States); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2678 (1982) (attorneys' fee limited to 20%-
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several states have passed legislation limiting attorneys' fees.16 In 1975,
Congress considered passing federal medical malpractice legislation17 to
address a perceived crisis in medical malpractice insurance costs.18 Con-
gress believed that the state response to medical malpractice costs had
been inadequate and warned that if the states failed to take comprehen-
sive action, the federal government would assume responsibility. t9 Sev-
eral states responded by enacting medical malpractice legislation.2 °
The California Legislature enacted the Medical Injury Compensation
Reform Act (MICRA)2t in 1975. The California Legislature designed
25% of any judgment rendered on claim against United States); Veterans Benefit Act, 38 U.S.C.
§ 3404(c) (1982) (attorneys' fee shall not exceed $10 in claims for benefits from Veterans Adminis-
tration); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406 (1982) (court may award reasonable attorneys' fee not
in excess of 25% of benefits received by claimant).
16. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 910-911 (Deering 1981) (regulating attorneys' fees in pro-
bate matters); CAL. LAB. CODE § 4906 (Deering 1976) (regulating attorneys' fees in workers' com-
pensation proceedings); 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 406 (Purdon Supp. 1985) (regulating attorneys'
fees in mortgage foreclosure actions); 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503 (Purdon 1971 & Supp. 1985)
(regulating attorneys' fees in action on a mortgage); 69 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 623 (Purdon 1971
& Supp. 1985) (regulating attorneys' fees in actions for repossession of a motor vehicle).
17. See Studley & Nye, Federal Malpractice Bills, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 22 (1976).
18. Insurance companies providing malpractice insurance to physicians either announced dras-
tic rate increases or withdrew from the medical malpractice market completely. These measures
were necessary, according to the insurance companies, because of the great increases in the number
of medical malpractice negligence claims and in the amounts awarded. See generally Note, Which
Equal Protection Standard for Medical Malpractice Legislation? 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 125, 125-
30 (1980).
19. Studley & Nye, supra note 17, at 22.
20. These statutes contained a number of provisions aimed at reducing medical malpractice
insurance costs and assuring the availability of quality health care services at a reasonable cost. See
Grossman, State by State Summary of Legislative Activities on Medical Malpractice, in A LEGISLA-
TOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 12 (1976).
In 1975, the following nine states enacted limitations on attorneys' contingency fees in medical
malpractice actions; California, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin. See Grossman, An Analysis of 1975 Legislation Relating to Medical Malpractice, in A
LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 10 (1976).
21. 1975 CAL. STATS. 3949. The following legislative statement reveals the purpose of
MICRA:
The Legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the State of
California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting in a poten-
tial breakdown of the health delivery system, severe hardships for the medically indigent, a
denial of access for the economically marginal, and depletion of physicians such as to sub-
stantially worsen the quality of health care available to the citizens of this state. The Legis-
lature acting within the scope of its police powers, finds the statutory remedy herein
provided is intended to provide an adequate and reasonable remedy within the limit of
what the foregoing public safety considerations permit now and into the foreseeable future.
Id. at 4007.
In 1975, insurance companies notified 2,000 southern California physicians that their insurance
Washington University Open Scholarship
638 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 64:635
MICRA to reduce medical malpractice insurance costs by reforming
medical malpractice litigation.22 The California statute, inter alla,23
placed a limit on the amount of fees an attorney could charge under a
contingency fee agreement in a medical malpractice action.24
Attorneys have challenged similar state statutory fees limitations on
due process and equal protection grounds. In Johnson v. St. Vincent Hos-
pital, Inc.,25 the Indiana Supreme Court struck down a due process chal-
lenge to a state limitation on attorneys' fees.26 The plaintiffs argued that
the statutory limitation on attorneys' fees for medical malpractice suits
would deprive medical malpractice victims of effective counsel. 27  The
court, however, concluded that the statute would not "seriously impede"
effective counsel.28
coverage would not be renewed. Four thousand physicians in northern California experienced a
380% increase in their insurance premiums. The number of medical malpractice claims increased
almost 200% from 1968 to 1974. See Keene, California's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in A LEGISLA-
TOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 27 (1976).
22. The Act also contains provisions designed to improve the quality of medical care and to
assure the availability of medical malpractice insurance. The medical quality assurance provisions
establish a system for investigating patient complaints, recording professional conduct in a central
file, instituting disciplinary actions, and adopting provisions for continuing physician education.
Note, supra note 6, at 834-37. The medical malpractice insurance provisions prohibit insurance
companies from discriminating against physicians who choose arbitration, provide the right to a
public hearing to insureds who have experienced a 10% or greater increase in premiums, and create
a Joint Underwriting Association to operate in the event that medical malpractice insurance is not
substantially available in a particular region. Keene, supra note 21, at 31. The Act includes reforms
in medical malpractice litigation, medical quality assurance, and insurance review because the legis-
lature determined that all interested parties (physicians, lawyers, insurance companies, and patients)
must sacrifice in order to reach a fair solution to the medical malpractice crisis. Id. at 30.
23. The Act also limits recovery to $250,000 for noneconomic harm. CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 3333.2(b) (Deering 1984). See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665,
211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985) ($250,000 limit on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice action
does not violate due process or equal protection).
24. See supra note 5.
25. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980). This case involved appeals from four separate cases.
26. Id. at 401-02, 404 N.E.2d at 602-03. The Indiana Medical Malpractice Act limits plaintiffs'
attorneys' fees to 15% of any award made from a state's compensation fund. The Act also provides
that a patient has the right to pay on aper diem basis, but this option must be exercised in writing at
the time of employment. IND. STAT. ANN. § 16-9.5-5-I (Burns 1983).
The plaintiffs also challenged other provisions of the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act: submis-
sion to a medical review panel, $500,000 limit on recovery, 2-year statute of limitations period for
most cases, creation of a compensation fund, and limitations on pleadings. Johnson, 273 Ind. at 380-
81, 404 N.E.2d at 590.
27. Id. at 401, 404 N.E.2d at 602.
28. Id. The court noted that the limitations on attorneys' fees do not apply to the first $100,000
of recovery because only awards over $100,000 are received from the compensation fund. Therefore,
the plaintiff and attorney could choose any fee arrangement for awards below $100,000.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion
in Carson v. Maurer,29 holding a statutory limitation on contingent attor-
neys' fees unconstitutional on due process grounds.3" The court noted
that the limitation on attorneys' fees in medical malpractice cases would
make such cases less attractive to attorneys. 3 1 As a result, medical mal-
practice victims would be unable to bring legitimate medical malpractice
claims because of the unavailability of counsel.
32
The Carson court also considered whether the statutory limitation vio-
lated the equal protection clause.3 3 The plaintiffs claimed such a viola-
tion, arguing that the limitation on attorneys' fees was unrelated to the
statute's purpose 34 of reducing medical malpractice insurance rates and
health care costs.3 5 The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that the
relationship between the statute and its purpose was "questionable."3 6
The court stated that jurors generally do not consider attorneys' fees in
assessing damages and that, therefore, the limitation would be unlikely to
29. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
30. Id. at 944-45, 424 A.2d at 838-39. The statutory provision provided that no attorney repre-
senting any party in any action for medical injury shall collect a contingency fee in excess of the
following limits:
(a) Fifty percent of the first S 1000 recovered;
(b) Forty percent of the next $2000 recovered;
(c) Thirty-three and one-third percent of the next $97,000 recovered;
(d) Twenty percent of all in excess of $ 100,000 recovered;
(e) Where the amount recovered is for the benefit of an infant or incompetent and the
action is settled without trial, the foregoing limits shall apply, except that the fee in
any amount recovered up to $50,000 shall not exceed 25 percent.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:8 (1983).
31. 120 N.H. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839.
32. Id.
33. Id. The plaintiffs argued that the distinction drawn between plaintiffs with medical mal-
practice claims and plaintiffs with other personal injury claims was unrelated to the purpose of the
statute. Therefore, the classification denied equal protection under the law between persons simi-
larly situated.
34. The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the legislature may choose to
address a particular social problem and create classifications without violating the equal protection
clause:
Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different
remedies. Or so the legislature may think.... Or the reform may take one step at a time,
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative
mind. ... The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there,
neglecting the others.... The prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no further
than invidious discrimination.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
35. 120 N.H. at 945, 424 A.2d at 839. The overall purpose of the New Hampshire statute was
to contain the costs of the medical injury reparations system. Id.
36. Id.
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reduce jury awards or insurance costs. 37
In DeFilippo v. Beck,38 the United States District Court for the District
of Delaware reviewed an equal protection challenge to a statutory limita-
tion on attorneys' fees in medical malpractice actions, 39 holding that the
statute did not violate the equal protection clause.40 Because medical
malpractice plaintiffs were not members of a suspect or quasi-suspect
class and the statute did not infringe upon any fundamental right, the
court reviewed the statute under the rational basis test.4" The court con-
cluded that the classification was rationally related to the legislative ob-
jective of alleviating medical malpractice costs because the limitations
would discourage attorneys from pursuing frivolous suits and would en-
courage prompt settlements.42
In Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc.,'3 the California Supreme Court
reviewed due process, equal protection, and separation of powers chal-
lenges to the statutory limitation on contingent attorneys' fees in medical
malpractice actions. First, the court considered whether the statute vio-
lated the due process right of medical malpractice plaintiffs to retain
counsel.' The plaintiffs argued that the fees under the statute were so
unreasonable that it would be impossible to find an attorney to represent
37. Id.
38. 520 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Del. 1981).
39. The statute limits plaintiffs' attorneys' fees in medical malpractice to 35% of the first
$100,000, 25% of the next $100,000, and 10% of the balance of any awarded damages. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (1984).
40. 520 F. Supp. at 1016.
41. Id. Until the 1970s, the Supreme Court applied two standards to equal protection review:
the strict scrutiny standard and the rational basis test. The Court applied the strict scrutiny stan-
dard when a legislative classification affected a fundamental right or distinguished between persons
upon some suspect basis. Under strict scrutiny, the legislative classifications must be necessary to
promote a compelling state interest.
If legislation did not affect a fundamental right or create suspect classifications, the Court applied
the rational basis test. Under the rational basis test, the legislative classification merely has to be
reasonably related to a legitimate legislative purpose.
An intermediate standard of review arose during the 1970s. This standard falls between the strict
scrutiny test and the rational basis test. The Supreme Court has applied an intermediate standard of
review when legislation has created quasi-suspect classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.
Under this standard, the classification must serve important governmental ends and must have a fair
and substantial relation to achievement of those ends. G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 670-74 (10th ed. 1980); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note
2, at 586-94.
42. 520 F. Supp. at 1016.
43. 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985).
44. Id. at 925, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79. Section 6146 does not deny plaintiffs the
right to retain counsel. Rather, it simply limits the compensation an attorney may obtain.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/14
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them.45 Moreover, the statute would force most competent attorneys
into more profitable personal injury cases, further infringing the plain-
tiffs' right to obtain counsel.46
The court, however, found that the statute authorized reasonably gen-
erous attorneys' fees4 7 and that no factual data supported the plaintiffs'
claim that the statute was driving competent lawyers out of medical mal-
practice litigation.48 The court concluded that it was unlikely that the
statute would deny plaintiffs access to the court.49 In addition, the court
noted that the validity of statutory limits on attorneys' fees had been well
established.5 °
The court next considered the plaintiffs' claim that the statute violated
the equal protection clause. The plaintiffs contended that the distinction
between medical malpractice plaintiffs and other personal injury plain-
tiffs was unrelated to the purpose of the statute and, therefore, the classi-
fication violated the equal protection clause.5' The plaintiffs argued that
jurors do not consider attorneys' fees in reaching a verdict.5 2 Thus, costs
to the insurance industry would be the same whether or not attorneys'
fees were limited.5 3
The court, however, rejected the plaintiffs' contention, finding that the
statute may prompt plaintiffs to agree to lower settlements because attor-
neys would receive a much "smaller bite" of the settlement under the
statute.54 Because lower settlements would reduce malpractice insurance
costs, the classification was reasonably related to the legislative purpose
of the statute.55 In addition, the court noted that the statute may deter
"attorneys from either instituting frivolous suits or encouraging their cli-
45. Id. at 927-28, 695 P.2d at 168, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
46. Id. at 929-30, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 82-83.
47. Id. at 928, 695 P.2d at 168-69, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
48. Id. at 930, 695 P.2d at 169, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
49. Id. at 926, 695 P.2d at 166, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 79.
50. Id. at 926, 695 P.2d at 167, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
51. Id. at 930-31, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
52. Id. at 930, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 931, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
55. Id. at 931, 695 P.2d at 170, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 83-84. The court also pointed out that the
limitations on attorneys' fees were rationally related to other MICRA provisions, such as the provi-
sion limiting noneconomic damages. See supra note 23. The court concluded that the legislature
may have determined that the limitations on attorneys' fees were an appropriate means of protecting
the plaintiffs' recovery that was already reduced by the other MICRA provisions. Id. at 932, 695
P.2d at 171, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
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ents to hold out for unrealistically high settlements. '5 6
Finally, the court considered whether the statute violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine." The plaintiffs argued that the legislature's reg-
ulation of attorneys' fees invaded a matter left solely to the judiciary. 8
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, noting that regulation of at-
torneys' fees has never been within the sole province of the judiciary and
that the legislature has regulated attorneys' fees throughout history.5 9
The Roa dissent6° argued that the statutory limitations denied medical
malpractice plaintiffs due process and equal protection. 6' The dissent
contended that the limitation significantly interfered with the plaintiffs'
right to retain counsel because the plaintiffs' attorneys would likely aban-
don medical malpractice litigation and pursue other more lucrative per-
sonal injury cases. 2
The dissent also argued that the statutory limitation denied equal pro-
tection, contending that the limitations created classifications that were
not rationally related to the legislative objectives of increasing plaintiffs'
recovery63 and reducing medical malpractice insurance costs. 64 No ra-
56. Id. at 931, 695 P.2d at 170-71, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
The court also rejected other equal protection arguments. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention
that the statute violated the equal protection clause because it limited plaintiffs' attorneys' fees but
not defense counsel's fees. The court concluded that the legislation could have determined that the
plaintiffs need additional protection to overcome diminished recoveries caused by high contingency
fees. Id. at 932, 695 P.2d at 171, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
The court also rejected plaintiffs' contention that the statute is a greater burden to more seriously
injured medical malpractice victims. The plaintiffs argued that the sliding scale limitation on attor-
neys' fees makes it more difficult for a seriously injured plaintiff to find an attorney willing to incur
the extra expense and time required in such cases. The court concluded that the legislature could
have believed that the sliding scale approach was more equitable than the fiat contingency fee. Id. at
933, 695 P.2d at 172, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 85.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Chief Justice Bird wrote for the three-justice dissent.
61. The dissent did not address the separation of powers challenge. The dissent, however,
found that § 6146 also violated the plaintiffs' first amendment right to petition the government for
redress of grievances. The dissent relied heavily upon the federal district court opinion, National
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors v. Walters, 589 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1984), which concluded that
a limit on attorneys' fees infringed upon the right of petition. The dissent's argument is largely
undermined by the Supreme Court's decision in that case, Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation
Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985) (upholding the validity of the $10 linit on attorneys' fees), which
the Court handed down after the Roa decision.
62. 37 Cal. 3d at 943, 695 P.2d at 179, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
63. Id at 944, 695 P.2d at 180, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
64. The dissent argued that in cases involving extensive damages, § 6146 would encourage
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tional basis existed for restricting attorneys' fees in only medical mal-
practice actions because the danger of frivolous suits also existed in
general personal injury actions.65 In addition, no rational basis existed
for restricting only the plaintiff's attorneys' fees.66 Although insurance
costs would remain unchanged regardless of the size of the plaintiff's at-
torneys' fees,67 defense counsel fees would directly affect insurance costs
because insurance companies directly pay such fees.68
The Roa court examined the constitutionality of limitations on attor-
neys' fees in medical malpractice actions more thoroughly than any pre-
vious court.69 The Roa majority properly concluded that the statutory
limitation on attorneys' fees did not deny the plaintiffs access to counsel,
because the plaintiffs made no factual showing that the limitation would
actually deny medical malpractice plaintiffs the right to retain counsel.7°
The majority also properly decided the equal protection challenge, fo-
cusing on the central purpose of MICRA and examining whether the
statutory limitation was rationally related to the purpose of the statute.
If a problem exists in a particular area, the legislature may enact legisla-
tion to deal with only that particular area. The legislature may seek to
solve social problems "one step at a time" and is under no obligation to
address all personal injury litigation problems at once.71 The legislature
may have determined that attorneys' fees contributed to soaring medical
malpractice costs. 72 The legislature may have rationally believed that the
plaintiffs' attorneys to settle and defense counsel to devote more time and undertake expensive dis-
covery prior to settlement. As a result, insurance costs would increase rather than decrease. The
dissent's argument, however, ignored the costs saved by avoiding trial and reaching settlement. Id.
at 948, 695 P.2d at 182-83, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 95-96.
65. Id. at 947, 695 P.2d at 182, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
66. Id. at 951, 695 P.2d at 185, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 98.
67, This argument ignored the fact that the greater the plaintiff's recovery, the greater the
insurance costs. If a plaintiff's attorney can receive 40% of any recovery, he may push for a higher
award.
68. The dissent contended that § 6146 was grossly underinclusive with regard to the goal of
decreasing premiums and argued that restricting defense costs would further reduce insurance costs.
The legislature considered regulation of defense counsel fees but decided that it was not necessary.
See supra note 6.
69, See supra notes 25-42 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 34.
72. The California medical community asserted that unscrupulous lawyers and their high con-
tingency fees caused the medical malpractice crisis. The legal community contended that insurance
companies made bad investments and charged high insurance rates to pay for losses on the stock
market and that medical malpractice was widespread. The California Auditor General studied in-
surance company finances and concluded that insurance companies were on the verge of bankruptcy
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plaintiffs' attorneys were overcompensated at the expense of the plaintiffs
as well as insurance companies.73
The Roa decision strengthens the position of statutory limitations on
attorneys' fees in medical malpractice suits. Other courts evaluating sim-
ilar statutory limitations will likely rely on this decision and follow its
comprehensive constitutional analysis.
L.A.M.
mainly because of significant increases in the number of medical malpractice claims and in the
amounts of recovery. See Keene, supra note 21, at 28 & 32.
73. See Note, supra note 6, at 943.
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